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I. INTRODUCTION
In this article, I would like to start by describing the concepts of the 
culture of authority and the culture of justification, as formulated by David 
Dyzenhaus. This will be followed by an analysis of some of the changes pro-
posed by the Act on the Supreme Court in Poland, which concern its func-
tioning, organisation and structure, and which were conducted on basis of 
the foregoing legal cultures. In my opinion, the distinction between the cul-
tures of authority and justification proposed by the Canadian theorist of law, 
makes an interesting contribution to the debate concerning the demarcation 
of public authority and, consequently, the principle of the separation of  pow-
ers. In the conclusion of the article, I argue that the proposed changes to the 
functioning of the Supreme Court are examples of legislative action based on 
the directives of the culture of authority, which can sometimes lead to viola-
tions of the rule of law. 
From legal, social and political perspectives, one of the most significant 
issues facing modern liberal democracy is the problem of the limits of public 
authority. In the reflections of legal philosophy, this issue was dominated by 
the Dworkinian critique of legal positivism. Ronald Dworkin rejected the legal 
positivist view that the law is legitimised by virtue of the fact of its being es-
tablished by authority. For Dworkin, a legitimate law is one that has a moral 
value, meaning that it protects the standards of liberal morality.1 This argu-
* Translation of the paper into English has been financed by the Minister of Science and 
Higher Education as part of agreement no. 541/P-DUN/2016. Translated by Stephen Dersley. 
(Editor’s note.) —— Produced under the grant NCN Opus 8 2014/2015/B/H/S5/00650.
1 Another approach is the idea of constitutional legitimacy, which holds that a law is legiti-
mised if it conforms to constitutional norms. The substantive provisions of the constitution that 
guarantee the fundamental rights of the individual are of particular significance here, as they 
categorise acts that violate the rights and freedoms of individuals guaranteed by the Constitution 
as being contrary to the axiology of the Constitution. For more extensive discussion, see: F.I. Mi-
chelman, Legitimation by Constitution (and the News from South Africa), Valparaiso University 
Law Review 44(4), 2010: 1015–1034.
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ment was widely accepted, especially among those who hold that control over 
the activities of the public authorities by means of law is illusory.2 Of course, 
the decisions of courts cannot be classed as easy when they are based on the 
standards of liberal democracy, especially if that society embraces pluralism. 
Thus, it is obvious that even people who strive to adopt a conciliatory ap-
proach to others, and use a healthy dose of common sense when solving prob-
lems, may find themselves in fundamental disagreement with others when it 
comes to the political or moral grounds for making decisions.3 And if this is 
the case, perhaps we ought to accept that the decisions made by the courts 
can be simultaneously justified and unjustified. In other words, since we are 
dealing with a liberal democracy, which presupposes different viewpoints due 
to its embrace of pluralist principles, it is to be expected that from time to 
time many of us will disagree with the ruling of a particular court for moral 
reasons. Obviously, such disagreement can also be driven by fear, ignorance 
or prejudice. But it is also sometimes the case that our opposition to a court 
decision is reasonable and justified.
Therefore, we must accept the fact that a system of public authority based 
on the rule of law, and especially on the separation of powers, may one day run 
into crisis. If the principle of the rule of law really means the rule of law, and 
not the rule of an authoritarian ruler, obedience to whom is based on coercion, 
then there must be a forum in which conflicts relating to the exercise of public 
authority are resolved. It goes without saying that in democracies the inde-
pendent courts provide such a forum.4
II. THE CULTURE OF AUTHORITY 
AND THE CULTURE OF JUSTIFICATION ACCORDING  
TO DAVID DYZENHAUS
Dyzenhaus pursued this line of thought in suggesting that within legal 
culture a distinction should be made between the culture of authority and 
the culture of justification.5 He stressed that this distinction between cultures 
2 Cf. D. Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller 
in Weimar, Oxford 1999.
3 Cf. W. Walluchow, On the neutrality of charter reasoning, in: J.F. Beltran, J.J. Moreso, 
D.M. Papayannis (eds.), Neutrality and Theory of Law, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London 
2013.
4 Many examples of this kind of court activity can be provided, but two seem so important 
that they should be mentioned here. The first example concerns the ruling of the Bavarian 
State Court, which ruled that a cross cannot be placed in a public-school building, since the 
freedom of religion guaranteed in the Constitution is thus restricted. Another example, which 
is no less famous and which, as some say, is the most commonly used precedent in the history 
of the United States of America, is that of Roe v Wade, 1973, in which the Supreme Court 
granted women the right to abortion, and ruled that prosecuting the practice would be uncon-
stitutional.
5 The opposite idea would have to be that of ‘popular constitutionalism’. The essence of popu-
lar constitutionalism is that the elected representatives of the people play a key role in resolving 
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should be associated with Etienne Mureinik, a South African constitutionalist 
and theoretician of law. In the early 1990s, Mureinik famously observed that 
the South African Constitution is a bridge leading from its apartheid past, 
belonging to a culture of authority, to its future, which must be a culture of 
justification.6
Let us now turn to a detailed description of the culture of justification, as 
presented by Dyzenhaus. At the outset, it is worth noting that the term ‘cul-
ture’ might suggest that the culture of justification consists of the principles of 
legal culture shared by the judiciary, the legislature and the executive. How-
ever, this distinction between the culture of authority and the culture of justi-
fication, in principle, is a tool for analysing the activities of the courts and the 
legislature, and not of all the public authorities.7
For Dyzenhaus, the culture of justification is situated between the culture 
of reflection (in other words the culture of authority) and the culture of neu-
trality. Dyzenhaus derived the culture of reflection from the ideas of Jeremy 
Bentham, for whom the creation of law by the legislature was the ideal form of 
lawmaking, as it reflects the will of the majority of society, in parliament. The 
task of the courts is to apply the law in such a way that their decisions best 
reflect the will of the legislature.8 On the other hand, the culture of neutrality 
emphasises that the judicial activity of the courts draws its legitimacy from 
the liberal principles that underpin democracy. Hence, the task of the courts 
is to maintain and uphold these principles.
The culture of justification takes the middle way between the culture of 
reflection/authority and the culture of neutrality. It shares with the culture 
of reflection the belief that the will of the people—reflected in in the decisions 
of the legislature—must be given preference. At the same time, it shares with 
the culture of neutrality the belief in the importance of the principles of lib-
eral democracy for the legitimacy of law. However, the culture of justification 
does not categorically demand that the courts treat laws that violate liberal 
principles as non-binding. The task of the court is to demand that the execu-
tive and the legislature provide the reasons for their taking such and such 
decision, and not another.9 The courts should examine such justifications, and 
decide whether or not they are reasonable.
constitutional problems. For more extensive discussion, see: K. Werhan, Popular constitutional-
ism, ancient and modern, UC Davis Law Review 46(1), 2012: 67–68.
6 Cf. E. Mureinik, A bridge to where? Introducing to interim Bill of Rights, South African 
Journal on Human Rights 10(1), 1994. According to Mureinik, the South African Constitution 
must first be seen as an act whose purpose was, in its basic sense, to overcome the dramatic his-
tory of the apartheid era, and to lay the foundations for a state based on democratic principles and 
values. These basic values are: dignity, equality and freedom.
7 G. Hooper, The rise of judicial power in Australia: is there now a culture of justification?, 
Monash University Law Review 41(1), 2015: 102–135.
8 For D. Dyzenhaus, as for L.L. Fuller, there is no definitive difference between substantive 
law and procedural law, between the rational justification process and the justification of a deci-
sion. D. Dyzenhaus, Proportionality and deference in a culture of justification, in: G. Huscroft, W. 
Bradley, B.W. Miller, G. Webber (eds.), Proportionality and the Rule of Law. Rights, Justification, 
Reasoning, Cambridge, 2015: 235.
9 A.L. Young, Democratic Dialog and the Constitution, Oxford, 2017, ch. 4.
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The culture of justification assumes that the legislature is the primary 
agent that creates the law, but at the same time it rejects the assumption 
that the results of elections or the will of the electorate constitute the basis of 
a healthy democracy. The basis for a properly functioning liberal democratic 
state is that all the authorities and voters involved in the decision-making 
process believe in the value of transparency and are always ready to be held 
accountable.10
Dyzenhaus’ notion of the culture of justification is complemented by the 
concept of respect for the legislature, meaning that the reasons presented 
by the legislative or executive branches should be treated with respect, or 
‘deference as respect’. Deference as respect is evident when a court’s delib-
erations pay attention to the reasons provided by the legislature in favour of 
a certain decision, rather than another. Nevertheless, the idea of deference 
as respect does not imply the subordination of the judiciary to the executive 
or legislative branches, but rather requires that judges pay special atten-
tion to the reasons given by the executive or legislative authorities, or to 
the rationales that can be reconstructed. This reasoning should primarily 
be concerned with establishing the relationship between the arguments and 
the decision made by the legislature. In all decisions, this relationship must 
fulfil one essential standard, namely the standard of reasonableness.11 In 
other words, if there are problems with interpretation, the task of the courts 
is to assume that the decisions of the legislative and the executive branches 
are, at least in principle, reasonable and rational, due to the fact that they 
are in line with liberal principles and human rights, for example. Only the 
grossly unfair and unjustified measures that are adopted by the state may 
be considered unreasonable.12
Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat offer an interesting interpretation of 
the culture of justification and the culture of authority. The authors succinctly 
define the culture of authority as a culture that requires justifications at the 
stage of assigning authority, but once authority is assigned, the authority sees 
no further need to justify its decisions. In contrast, in a culture of justifica-
tion, even after authority has been assigned, the authority is still required to 
justify all its decisions. As Cohen-Eliya and Porat emphasise, the culture of 
justification consists of directives requiring, firstly, that any decisions of the 
10 Of course, D. Dyzenhaus is a proponent of legal constitutionalism, not political constitu-
tionalism. If we accept that political and legal constitutionalism are certain extremes, then we can 
assume that legal constitutionalism prefers liberal principles that are in conflict with the will of 
the legislature, even if it is democratically legitimised, while political constitutionalism proclaims 
that democracy always abandons liberal principles in the event of a conflict. See: Law as justifica-
tion, South African Journal on Human Rights 14(1), 1998: 34.
11 D. Dyzenhaus, Dignity in administrative law: judicial deference in a culture of justification, 
Review of Constitutional Studies 17(1), 2012: 135–136.
12 As Fuller suggests, in certain forms of social order (a legal order is an example of such 
an order) a decision is legitimised not only when it can pass the test of reasonableness, but also 
when it is the result of a rational argument. In other words, judges not only judge the content 
of a legal decision, but also address the ways in which it is justified. Cf. D. Dyzenhaus, Propor-
tionality and Deference in a Culture of Justification, in: G. Huscroft, B.W. Miller, G. Webber 
(eds.), op. cit.: 233.
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public authority should be justified by giving the reasons when those decisions 
affect the legally protected interests of individuals; and, secondly, that these 
decisions should be ultimately derived from the normative political order of 
a given society. In a culture of justification, the authorities are required to 
formulate a substantive justification for all of their actions, in order to demon-
strate their legitimacy. In other words, the decisions of a public authority draw 
their legitimacy from the reason that the authority provides in the process of 
justifying its decisions. Cohen-Eliya and Porat also assert that a culture of 
justification manifests itself, for example, by embracing a broad conception of 
fundamental rights, by emphasising the role of non-legal moral and political 
principles in the process of applying and interpreting the constitution, by the 
lack of barriers to substantive review, and by the introduction of a two-stage 
process for evaluating the actions of public authorities: namely, first there is 
the identification of violations of the law, and then an evaluation of the man-
ner in which the public authority justifies these violations.13
Other characteristics of these legal cultures can be identified through an 
analysis of the basic assumptions of liberal democracy. First and foremost, 
these include the problem of the legitimisation of authority. In the culture of 
authority, justification is particularly relevant during the establishment of 
power, whereas with the culture of justification, even if an authority has been 
legitimised, its decisions still require justification. The second issue concerns 
the scope of authority. In the culture of authority, the scope of authority is 
clearly defined by law. Within these prescribed limits, the task of the courts is 
not to decide whether or not the decisions of an authority are legitimate, but is 
merely to establish that an authority is authorised to make a decision. In con-
trast, with the culture of justification, any decision of a public authority has to 
be justified, since the legitimacy of that decision is rooted in the justification—
not in the fact of the authority possessing legitimacy. The third issue is the 
question of fundamental rights. In the culture of authority, the law constitutes 
a boundary on the exercise of public authority, in the sense that this boundary 
cannot be crossed. In the culture of justification, the law is treated as a value 
in itself—one which should be advanced, supported and implemented. Laws 
should be the reference point for court decisions, as substantive criteria which 
form the basis from which all the activities of the authority are assessed. The 
fourth issue is that of the limits of reason. The culture of authority is sceptical 
regarding the reasoning abilities of human beings and tends to emphasise hu-
man frailty as a barrier to rational thinking—judges being no exception in this 
regard. On the other hand, the culture of justification is more optimistic and 
assumes that human beings are capable of formulating rational arguments 
and deliberating thoughtfully, and that they are capable of accepting rational 
and reasonable decisions. The fifth issue concerns the theory of democracy, 
an issue on which these two cultures take different views. The culture of au-
thority is closely tied to the pluralist view of democracy, while the culture of 
13 Cf.: M. Cohen-Eliya, I. Porat, Proportionality and the culture of justification, The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 59(2), 2011. Also D. Dyzenhaus, Law as justification; M. Cohen-
Eliya, I. Porat, op. cit.: 463–465.
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justification is associated with deliberative democracy. In the pluralist theory, 
democracy is an arena for the cut and thrust of different views and interests, 
such as concerning the distribution of goods. In a deliberative democracy, deci-
sions acquire their legitimacy due to the way in which they are taken. Author-
ity is legitimised not so much through compromise, as on the basis of consent, 
which can be reached through deliberation. 
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the development of the cul-
ture of justification is inextricably linked to the traumatic experience of the 
Second World War. This war provided us with two lessons in political culture: 
deep suspicion of all so-called people’s democracies, as these transformed into 
totalitarian regimes in the early twentieth century; and an acute awareness 
of the threat that lies within nationalism. Therefore, the culture of justifica-
tion is not based on the so-called popular opinions about what is good or bad. 
In this regard, it is an elitist culture, seeking to eliminate the prejudice and 
irrationality characteristic of public opinion from the courts. The culture of 
justification can also be seen as sui generis, anti-local and anti-nationalist, in 
the sense that it is not sensitive to the criterion of nationality.
Two further ideas are important factors in the development of the cul-
ture of justification, namely perfectionism and rationalism. The former is the 
European conception of the organic state and law. In this view, a state is not 
the territory on which a given collection of individuals lives, whose relations 
are determined by the state. A state is rather a union of people who share 
the same values, and promote or protect them. The role of individuals is de-
termined by the community of which they are members. The state expresses 
the solidarity of the community, and emphasises its permanent connection 
with it. Rationalism is a phenomenon related to the Enlightenment ideas of 
rationality and the objectivity of law. The culture of justification assumes the 
rationality and objectivity of the law, and the rational and objective protection 
of human rights. Rationality and objectivity are fundamental elements of the 
culture of justification.14
III. AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGES 
TO THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SUPREME COURT
Let us recall the two basic assumptions of the culture of justification. The 
first is that this culture consists of directives which require that any decision 
of the public authorities should be justified by giving the reasons for it, when 
such a decision affects the legally protected interests of individuals. The sec-
ond assumption is the category of deference as respect. This means that the 
judges (but not exclusively) should ensure that they respect the reasons put 
forward by the executive or legislative authorities, or the reasoning that could 
14 Cohen-Eliya and Porat also stress the historical and intellectual causes behind the spread 
of the culture of justification: the development of the doctrine of human rights; the fall of national-
ism and the rise of humanism and internationalism. 
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be reconstructed to indicate a rational link between the arguments and the 
conclusions of the legislature. 
Now we can focus on the first of these assumptions in the light of changes 
proposed by the Act on the Supreme Court:15 on 12 July 2017, a draft parlia-
mentary bill on the Supreme Court was filed to the Polish Parliament (printed 
matter no. 1727 of the VIII Sejm), and then the Act was passed on 20 July 
2017. In the justification of the bill on the Supreme Court (covering over 50 
pages) it is stated that:
the Act is part of a wider reform of the judiciary, including the amendment to the Act on the 
National Council of the Judiciary and the Common Courts Organisation, which is intended 
to ensure the fairness of judicial decisions, faster procedure and restore public confidence in 
the courts.16 
Naturally, changes to the functioning of one of the most important judi-
cial organs, namely the Supreme Court, which entail far-reaching transfor-
mations in the organisation, and changes with regard to the appointment of 
judges and their competences, must—in a democratic state—be carried out in 
a careful and deliberate manner, with the involvement of public consultation, 
so as not to surprise the citizens or undermine their trust in the state and the 
law established under it. However, the manner in which this bill was drafted 
and passed give cause for considerable concern.
It is very significant that the draft bill on the Supreme Court was filed as 
a deputies’ bill, despite the fact that it concerns matters of crucial importance 
for the functioning of the Supreme Court and the justice system as a whole 
in Poland. Since the bill was filed in this way, it was not subject to extensive 
public consultation, let alone expert analysis, either before its submission to 
the Polish Sejm or later. Moreover, it was widely noted that those behind the 
bill did not publicly disclose its main purposes during the preparatory stages. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, the National Council of the Judiciary and 
the judiciary self-government bodies did not participate in any way during the 
preparation stage of the bill, even in individual consultations.17 Incidentally, 
the draft bill on the Supreme Court was a project involving the regulation of the 
system and jurisdiction of a public authority and thus—under Article 123(1) 
of the Constitution—it is excluded from urgent procedures, and therefore 
passing the Act in an accelerated process was not possible. This requirement 
of cautious procedure with regard to the draft bill is also justified by the po-
sition of the Supreme Court in the system of public authority. The Supreme 
Court is the guardian of the Constitution due to the powers conferred on it 
15 The analysis does not take into account recent changes to the Act on the Supreme Court 
proposed by the President, but in my opinion they do not change the essence of the analysis of 
the proposed changes in the draft parliamentary bill, in terms of the culture of authority and the 
culture of justification.
16 Cf. The position of the Deans of the Faculties of Law on the Draft Bill on the Supreme Court. 
17 Cf. D. Mazur, W. Żurek, The judiciary in Poland on the threshold of 2017: challenges and 
threats, Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny 79(1), 2017 <doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/
rpeis.2017.79.1.2>.
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by the Constitution and other statutes. It suffices to mention just a few of 
them in order to confirm this special position. The Supreme Court investigates 
electoral protests; ascertains the validity of parliamentary and presidential 
elections, and the validity of national and constitutional referendums; inves-
tigates complaints concerning the National Electoral Commission’s rejection 
of the financial reports of political parties and election committees, and fi-
nancial information on the manner in which the political party disburses 
its subsidy. The decisions taken by the Supreme Court in these cases have 
a direct impact on the financing of political parties from the state budget and 
the possibility of their participation in subsequent parliamentary elections. 
If we also bear in mind that due to their position in the Supreme Court, 
three judges are also members of the National Electoral Commission, and 
that the First President of the Supreme Court is, due to this position, also 
the President of the State Tribunal, it is clear that the drafting of the bill on 
the Supreme Court should have been stringently justified and subjected to 
public scrutiny.
We can now turn to the second assumption of the culture of justification 
to analyse the draft of the bill from this perspective. As the drafters of the 
bill write in the justification:
The purpose of the bill is, in particular, to improve the functioning of the Supreme Court and 
to democratise the process of appointing judges to it. The new regulations are designed to 
guarantee that the role of judge will be fulfilled by persons with the highest professional and 
ethical qualifications. 
Thus, the analysis of the solutions adopted in the draft bill on the Supreme 
Court leads to the conclusion that they do not foster the fair and efficient 
functioning of this institution. Moreover, as can be seen through the example 
of Article 87 § 1 of the draft bill, the Act will have an adverse effect on the 
functioning of the Supreme Court. According to this provision, when the Act 
comes into force the current Supreme Court judges will be retired, with the 
exception of those judges appointed by the Minister of Justice or possibly by 
the President of the Republic of Poland. The implementation of this provision, 
without leaving even a minimum number of judges, along with the appoint-
ment of new judges who have never adjudicated in the Supreme Court, will 
obviously not be conducive to the smooth functioning of this court. If the intent 
of the authors was to radically change the organisation of the Supreme Court, 
retiring all its judges and not proposing that the remaining judges stay in ac-
tive service will inevitably destroy the work of this court.
The Act also introduces significant changes to the organisational struc-
ture and principles of the Supreme Court by introducing three chambers, 
namely the Public Law Chamber, the Private Law Chamber and the Disci-
plinary Chamber. Of course, if changes to the functioning of the Supreme 
Court did improve and expedite proceedings before it, these changes would 
be commendable, but the absence of a clear criterion for assigning cases to 
the different chambers certainly does not facilitate the functioning of the 
Supreme Court.
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Moreover, the reduction of the number of judges in the Supreme Court 
from 93 to 44, until the implementing provisions come into force, will place 
a significant burden on the court and lengthen the proceedings, which will 
thereby violate the right of citizens to have their cases considered without 
undue delay. Similar outcomes may ensue from granting the Minister of 
Justice the authority to delegate district court judges for service as judges of 
the Supreme Court. Such a state of affairs will entail that the judges of the 
lowest rank, who have never ruled in an appellate court, will be able to hear 
cases in the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the delegated judges of district 
courts will be able to have a decisive impact on the proceedings, in a way 
that is contrary to the separate opinion of a Supreme Court judge.
IV. CRITICISM OF THE CULTURE OF AUTHORITY
The foregoing brief analysis of the draft changes to the functioning of the 
Supreme Court and the justification of the draft bill demonstrate that the 
latest actions of the legislature with regard to the Supreme Court pertain to 
a culture of authority. Of course, I am not arguing that the acceptance of the 
basic directive of the culture of authority—which is that there is no need for 
an authority to justify its decisions—is a defining feature of the current legis-
lature, but in the case of the Act in question, it is very clearly present.
Dyzenhaus opposes the culture of authority, as he holds that acceptance 
of its directives entails acceptance of formalism in the application of law 
and the adoption of a formal-dogmatic approach to the rule of law. Such 
a position culminates in undesirable political and moral consequences. With 
regard to undesirable political consequences, the crucial issue is the viola-
tion of the rule of law, which could result in: unjustified interference with 
the rights of the individual, imbalance in the separation of powers, unlaw-
ful lawmaking, and threats to judicial independence. When it comes to the 
moral consequences, I have in mind a lack of confidence as to whether legal 
regulations are made in accordance with the public interest/common good, 
even if they are lawful.18
Let us just add that this consideration of the unfavourable or undesirable 
consequences of adopting the directives of the culture of authority leads di-
rectly to the question of whether the rule of law is the rule of moral principle. 
Why should trust in the state be considered a moral value? On the one hand, 
when the concept of the rule of law is treated as procedural morality, it reflects 
the idea that the necessary condition for the fulfilment of substantive objec-
tives by means of laws is the way in which they are established.19 On the other 
18 See D. Dyzenhaus, Introduction, in: idem (ed.), Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of 
Legal Order, Oxford, Portland, Oregon, 1999: 6–7. And A. Hutchinson, Rule of law revisited: de-
mocracy and courts, in: D. Dyzenhaus (ed.), Recrafting the Rule of Law: 199.
19 By referring to Fuller’s famous eight conditions of legality, it can be stated that a law ful-
filling the eight conditions of legality is a necessary condition for the law to have a moral value.
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hand, the law does in any case implement conventional justice. Therefore it 
is important that the concept of the rule of law should be established as a set 
of moral standards, without assuming that these standards reflect a purpose. 
According to Dyzenhaus, the concept of the rule of law should not be identi-
fied either with the morality of social justice or with the will of the sovereign, 
even if this is legitimised by the outcome of democratic and free elections. 
This concept is best understood as the ‘ethics of civility’, which is expressed in 
the requirement that the state take care of all individuals. Similarly, Heller 
argued that the rule of law works best when it assumes that all people are 
worthy and deserve state care in the public sphere, and that they are involved 
in the public sphere and are recognised as citizens.20
As mentioned before, one of the undesirable consequences that ensues from 
the political adoption of the directives of the culture of authority, according 
to Dyzenhaus, is the threat to the principle of judicial independence. In this 
regard, it is worth revisiting his excellent book Judging the Judges, Judging 
Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation and the Apartheid Legal Order, in which—
while examining hearings, or rather written testimony, as no judge came in 
person to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)—Dyzenhaus noted 
that a lot of testimonies contained phrases along the lines of: ‘There is no point 
in digging up and dwelling on the past,’ ‘It is only now that we begin to learn 
what it was really like,’ ‘We had no choice, Parliament is sovereign’, ‘95% of 
our work had nothing at all to do with apartheid.’21
All these utterances essentially revolve around one issue, namely the de-
fence of the independence of the courts and the judiciary.22 This issue is tied 
up with the question of whether a judge can be brought before a tribunal, 
a court or a committee which could pass judgment on whether a particular 
decision was the right one to make (and even whether it was morally right), 
or whether this would constitute a violation of the independence of the courts, 
which guarantees their independent adjudication.
In the light of these comments, the fact there were no judges present at the 
hearing before the TRC is significant. Had they participated in the hearings, 
they could have shown that in civil democracy there are citizens who shoulder 
a special responsibility. Such an acceptance of their responsibilities towards 
the state and democracy would have borne witness to their moral citizenship. 
They could have treated their presence as an opportunity to publicly demon-
strate their responsibility for past actions, and their concern for the future—
with regard to the relationship between the state, the courts and the citizen. 
This would have been an example of how judges can meet the requirements 
of the culture of justification: presenting their arguments publicly would not 
20 See D. Dyzenhaus, Introduction: 8; also idem, Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: 
Truth, Reconciliation and the Apartheid Legal Order, Oxford 1998, 138–141. See idem, Introduc-
tion: why Carl Schmitt?, in: idem (ed.), Law as Politics. Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, 
London, 1998: 6–7.
21 See D. Dyzenhaus, Judging the Judges: 165–168. 
22 For more extensive discussion see: J. Zajadło, Judicial conscience, Ruch Prawniczy, Eko-
nomiczny i Socjologiczny 79(4), 2017 <doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/rpeis.2017.79.4.3>.
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have constituted a violation of the principle of judicial independence. Dyzen-
haus asserts that the relations between the legislative, judicial and executive 
branches are not dependent solely on the principles and norms set forth in 
the constitution, but also—and primarily—on how the judges perform their 
duties. Judges should perceive the role they play in the legal state as that of 
imposing the concept of ‘legality’, a concept which is not necessarily tied to the 
concept of ‘compliance with the law’.23
V. CONCLUSION
If we accept the two basic requirements of the culture of justification—
namely the requirement that the decisions of the public authority be justified, 
by providing the reasons behind them, and the requirement that the judges 
give deference to the reasons offered by the executive or legislative authorities, 
or to the reasons that judges themselves can reconstruct in order to identify 
the rational link between the arguments and the final conclusions of the leg-
islature—it is necessary to acknowledge that with the case of the draft bill on 
the Supreme Court in Poland we are dealing with a culture of authority, which 
requires justification of the actions of an authority only at the moment of estab-
lishment, after which the authority no longer perceives the need to justify its 
decisions. Unfortunately, as Dyzenhaus points out, countries that underwent 
systemic transformation have a strong tendency to switch from a culture of 
justification to a culture of authority, in the same way that Germany did after 
1933. When a government adopts the principles of the culture of authority, es-
pecially in ‘young’ democracies, there is an acute risk of arbitrary and unjusti-
fied actions, especially when it comes to the protection of the basic rights of the 
individual. The possible consequences of such actions are all too obvious. 
The process described here can also be observed at work in the countries 
of Western Europe, although the origins are of a different nature to those in 
countries that have undergone systemic transformation. Particularly after the 
September 11, Western societies have made a slow but noticeable transition 
from states which link the fight against terrorism with restrictions on the 
rights of individuals. Thus, the conclusion that can be drawn is that the con-
cept of the culture of justification can serve as the basis for a critical analysis 
of not just the ‘young’ democracies, but also the countries of ‘Old Europe’, de-
scribed metaphorically by Dyzenhaus as the guardians of the Enlightenment 
flame.24
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Summary
The aim of this article is to describe two legal cultures, namely the culture of authority and 
the culture of justification, as formulated by David Dyzenhaus. This distinction between legal cul-
tures proposed by the Canadian theorist of law makes an interesting contribution to the discus-
sion on how to make headway with the problem of determining the limits of public authority and, 
consequently, the problem of implementing the principle of the separation of powers in such a way 
that conflicts do not arise. In general, with the culture of authority, justification of the actions 
of an authority is necessary only when it is being established, and once its authority has been 
established, the authority sees no further need to justify its decisions. Whereas in the culture of 
justification, after an authority has already been established, the rules of the culture of justifica-
tion require that the authority continue to justify all its decisions. The reconstruction of these 
conceptions of legal cultures are illustrated by the recently proposed Act on the Supreme Court 
in Poland. The conclusion of the paper indicates that the proposed changes to the functioning of 
the Supreme Court are clear examples of legislative action based on the directives of a culture of 
authority, which may lead to violations of the rule of law.
